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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Industrial Commission Board of Review ("Board")
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16.

II.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Board's decision to deny unemployment
benefits to an employee who was discharged after testing positive
for marijuana on two separate occasions in violation of the
employer's written policy was supported by sufficient evidence.

III.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

Utah Employment Security Act, Utah Code Ann. Section
35-4-5(b)(l).
Ineligibility for benefits.
An individual is ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
*

*

*

(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant
was discharged for just cause or for an act or
omission in connection with employment, not
constituting a crime, which is deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's
rightful interest, if so found by the commission,
and thereafter until the claimant has earned an
amount equal to at least six times the claimant's
weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered
employment.
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IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Respondent Morton Thiokol, Inc. ("Respondent") incorpor-

ates by reference the statement of the Nature of the Case set
forth at pages 3 and 4 of the Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union except as specifically stated below.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Respondent, Morton Thiokol, Inc., is a private employer

with numerous contracts with the Federal Government and Agencies
of the Federal Government.

Respondent is also widely known as a

contractor of rocket boosters for the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's ("NASA") space shuttle program.1
Appellant, Kevin R. Johnson, was employed by Respondent as a
welder for two-and-one-half years until he was discharged for
cause on December 11, 1987. (Claimant's Statement of Reason for
Discharge, Record at p. 2.)
Appellant was discharged from his employment after
testing positive for marijuana on two separate occasions.
(Administrative Law Judge Hearing February 11, 1988, Record at

x

These facts are not set forth in the record. However,
Respondent asks this Court to take judicial notice of these facts
pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence on the ground
that these matters are of common and general knowledge within the
Court's jurisdiction. See, DeFusion Company v. Utah Liquor
Control Commission, 613 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Utah 1980); Trimble Real
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah App.
1988).
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p. 14.)

Appellant was tested for drugs pursuant to a written drug

testing policy established by Respondent in July of 1985. (Administrative Law Judge Hearing February 11, 1988, Record at p. 15.)
Appellant does not dispute he knew of Respondent's drug testing
policy prior to the first test and that he tested positive for an
illegal drug, marijuana, on both occasions.

(Stipulated to by

counsel for Appellant; Administrative Law Judge Hearing October
26, 1988, Record at p. 64.) (Administrative Law Judge Hearing
February 11, 1988, Record at p. 20.)

It is also undisputed that

Respondent's drug testing program and testing of Appellant complied
with the requirements of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act,
U.C.A. § 34-38-1 et seg. (attached hereto as Addendum 1 ) .
Appellant admitted to using marijuana prior to the first
time he tested positive.

(Administrative Law Judge Hearing

October 26, 1988, Record at p. 64.)

Although Appellant denied

using marijuana between the time of the first test (September 21,
1987) and the time of the second test (November 25, 1987), the
Board found the Appellant's testimony not credible based on the
testimony of Dr. Kerr, Respondent's Medical Director.

Dr. Kerr

testified that the testing procedures adopted and followed by
Respondent were designed to account for the possibility of passive
inhalation as well as gradual dissipation of an illegal
substance.

(Board of Review Decision, Record at p. 88.)

Dr. Kerr

testified that Respondent's drug testing program includes
follow-up testing for marijuana six weeks after the initial
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positive test, and that the procedure complied with the
recommendation of the Center for Human Toxicology at the University
of Utah. (Administrative Law Judge Hearing October 26, 1988,
Record at p. 83.)

Dr. Kerr also testified that only actual use of

marijuana could account for the Appellant testing positive on the
second test, and that a test could only be positive for a brief
period if it results from extreme exposure2 to passive
inhalation.

(Administrative Law Judge Hearing October 26, 1988,

Record at p. 80-81.)

Dr. Kerr's testimony was unrebutted.3

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court must affirm the Board's decision denying
Appellant unemployment benefits on the ground that he was

2

Extreme exposure was defined as three or four hours of
confinement in a small room or car with three to six people heavily
smoking marijuana.
3

Evidence was also solicited from Dr. Ellwood L. Loveridge.
Appellant, however, objected to this testimony and the objection
was sustained by the Board of Review. (Administrative Law Judge
Hearing October 26, 1988, Record at pp. 72-73; Board of Review
Decision, Record at p. 87.) The testimony of Dr. Loveridge, even
if considered, is not relevant because Dr. Loveridge is not an
expert in marijuana testing or research, his offered testimony is
based solely on the verbal comments of ten individuals and not on
any scientific study, and he has no direct knowledge of the testing
of the ten individuals. Appellant and the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") have both attempted in this appeal to introduce
evidence from the National Law Journal that is not in the record
below. Respondent objects to this Court's consideration of the
evidence provided by Dr. Loveridge and the "facts" not found in the
record set forth in Appellant's Brief at pp. 13, 14 and 15 and in
the ACLU's Brief at p. 25.
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was necessary in order for Respondent to avoid actual or potential
harm.
The other two elements determinative of "just cause" are
also clearly established by the evidence-

First, if Appellant did

in fact smoke marijuana after the first test, he had the power to
control his conduct and prevent the second positive test.

Even if

Appellant's testimony concerning passive inhalation is accepted as
true (which the Board did not accept), Appellant had many
alternatives available to him and within his power and control to
accept in order to avoid being exposed to the marijuana smoking of
his roommates.
test.

He thus had ability to prevent a second positive

Finally, Appellant admitted that he knew he could be

discharged for testing positive for drugs.
The Board's decision must be affirmed because the
evidence presented meets or exceeds the criteria for "just cause"
necessary to deny unemployment benefits.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE BOARD'S DECISION DENYING APPELLANT UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
This Court must affirm the Board's decision unless it

determines "it was wrong because only the opposite conclusion
could be drawn from the facts."

Champlin Petroleum v. Department

of Employment Security, 744 P.2d 330, 331 (Utah App. 1987).

This

Court is bound by the factual findings of the Board "[s]o long as
there is evidence of any substance whatever to support the factual
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1.

Appellant's Conduct Evidences Culpability.

The Industrial Commission's administrative rule for
determining "just cause" provides the following explanation of
"culpability."
Culpability. This is the seriousness of the
conduct as it affects continuance of the employment relationship. The discharge must have been
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to
the employer's rightful interests. A discharge
would not be considered "necessary" if it is not
consistent with reasonable employment practices.
The wrongness of the conduct must be considered
in the context of the particular employment and
how it affects the employer's rights. If the
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment
and there is no expectation that the conduct will
be continued or repeated, potential harm may not
be shown and therefore it is not necessary to
discharge the employee.
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para Bl (1986).
All employers and employees, including Respondent and
Respondent's employees, are entitled to a drug-free workplace not
only because of the significant safety hazard that drug use
creates, but also because of the tremendous loss of human and
monetary resources that results from drugs.

Respondent recognized

these concerns and acted to protect itself, its employees, and the
general public by implementing a written drug and alcohol testing
program in July of 1985.
The Utah Legislature, because of similar concerns, made
formal findings and enacted the Drug and Alcohol Testing Act.
That Act states:

-8-

The Legislature finds that a healthy and
productive work force, safe working conditions
free from the effects of drugs and alcohol, and
maintenance of the quality of products produced
and services rendered in this state, are
important to employers, employees and the general
public. The Legislature further finds that the
abuse of drugs and alcohol creates a variety of
workplace problems, including increased injuries
on the job, increased absenteeism, increased
financial burden on health and benefit programs,
increased workplace theft, decreased employee
morale, decreased productivity, and decline in
the quality of products and services.
U.C.A. § 34-38-1.

Respondent instituted its drug and alcohol

testing program to protect legitimate interests and to avoid the
actual and potential harms resulting from the use of illegal drugs
as identified by the Legislature.
Respondent not only has the concerns reflected by the
Legislature's findings, but as a government contractor of highly
sophisticated national defense products, it must comply with
special regulations promulgated by the United States Department of
Defense governing federal contractors concerning drugs in the
workplace.

On September 28, 1988, the Department of Defense

issued an Interim Rule addressing drugs in the workplace.
Reg. 37,763, attached hereto as Addendum 2.5

53 Fed.

The Interim Rule

articulates the Defense Department policy that defense contractors

5

0n October 21, 1988 Congress passed the Drug-Free Workplace
Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690. This Act was signed into law by
President Reagan on November 18, 1988, and became effective on
March 18, 1989.
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shall maintain a program for achieving a drug-free workplace, and
adopts the following findings:
(a) The use of illegal drugs, on or off
duty, is inconsistent with law-abiding behavior
expected of all citizens. Employees who use
illegal drugs, on or off duty, tend to be less
productive, less reliable, and prone to greater
absenteeism resulting in the potential for
increased cost, delay, and risk to the government
contract.
(b) The use of illegal drugs, on or off
duty, by employees can impair the ability of
those employees to perform tasks that are
critical to proper contract performance and can
also result in the potential for accidents on
duty and for failures that can pose a serious
threat to national security, health, and safety.
(c) The use of illegal drugs, on or off
duty, by employees in certain positions can
result in less than the complete reliability,
stability, and good judgment that are consistent
with access to sensitive information. Use of
illegal drugs also creates the possibility of
coercion, influence, and irresponsible action
under pressure that may pose a serious risk to
national security, and health and safety.
Based on these findings, the Department of Defense
mandates that in certain contracts with the Department of Defense,
including contracts with Respondent, the contractor shall
institute and maintain a program for achieving a drug-free work

Respondent, as an employer and in particular a government
contractor, has a rightful and reasonable interest in a drug-free
environment and it must implement a written drug and alcohol
testing program to promote such an environment.

-10-

Appellant

contends that culpability may be found only if there is actual job
impairment; this position, however, contradicts the clear language
of Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act and
the Industrial Commission's administrative rules as well as prior
case law.

The Court need only find that the discharge is

necessary to avoid actual or potential harm and is consistent with
reasonable business practice.

Respondent's written drug testing

policy together with the strong policy statements and requirements
of the Utah Legislature and the United States Department of
Defense evidence Respondent's reasonable right to maintain and
expect a work environment that is free from the innumerable
problems (actual or potential) created by the use of drugs and
alcohol.

Thus, this Court must find that the Board's decision

with regard to the element of "culpability" is supported by the
facts.
2. Appellant's Conduct Was Within His Power and Capacity
to Control or Prevent.
The Industrial Commission's administrative rule for
determining "just cause" contains the following explanation of
"control".
Control. The conduct must have been within
the power and capacity of the claimant to control
or prevent.
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para Bl (1986).
The Board chose to disregard Appellant's stated denial of
marijuana use after the first test, and instead, relied upon the
testimony of Dr. Kerr.

He testified that Respondent's testing
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program incorporated procedures to eliminate both passive
inhalation and gradual dissipation of marijuana as causes for
Appellant's second positive test.
Record at p. 87)

(Board of Review Decision,

The law is well settled that conflicting

evidence does not compel the conclusion that the Board's decision
is not supported by any evidence. See Young v. Board of Review,
731 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1986); Terminal Service Co. v. Board of
Review, 714 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1986).
In this case, sufficient evidence supports the Board's
decision.

First, the Appellant admitted prior use of marijuana.

Second, the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Kerr established that
Respondent's testing program allowed for follow-up testing six
weeks after a positive test.

The testing program resulted from

Dr. Kerr's consultation with the Center for Human Toxicology at
the University of Utah.

Third, Dr. Kerr's unrebutted testimony

established that only extreme exposure to passive inhalation, such
as confinement in a car or small room for three or four hours with
three to six people heavily smoking marijuana, could result in a
positive test from passive inhalation.
Dr. Kerr further testified that for a positive test to result from
passive inhalation, a test must be administered shortly after the
extreme exposure.

Since the Board decided to disregard the

Appellant's testimony denying his marijuana use after the first
positive test, this Court must accept that finding, and conclude
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that there was substantial evidence that the Appellant had the
ability to control his conduct.
Even if the Board believed Appellant's testimony
concerning passive inhalation, the evidence establishes that
Appellant retained the capacity to prevent passive inhalation.
Appellant claimed his roommates were constantly smoking marijuana
in his apartment.

Notwithstanding Appellant's conduct in allowing

his roommates to criminally use and possess marijuana, as the
Board alluded to in its Decision at pages 89-90,6 Appellant
failed to either curtail further use by his roommates in the
apartment or to completely remove himself from the apartment.
Numerous alternative avenues within his power and control were
available to prevent passive inhalation.

First, Appellant could

have reported the conduct of his roommates to the landlord and
sought his assistance in curbing their illegal activities.
Second, he could have acted to avoid criminal prosecution and
reported the conduct to the police.

Third, Appellant could have

found a new place to live or moved in with a friend until the end
of his lease.

Each of these alternatives was readily available to

Appellant, and each would have allowed Appellant to avoid the

Appellant's actions appear to be a clear violaton of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (attached hereto as Addendum 3).
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perceived risk of testing positive for marijuana from passive
inhalation* 7
The Court therefore must find that the Board's decision
concerning "control" is supported by the evidence because
Appellant clearly had the power and capacity to prevent testing
positive for marijuana.
3.

Appellant Clearly Acted with Knowledge.

The Industrial Commission's administrative rule for
determining "just cause" contains the following explanation of
"knowledge."
Knowledge. The employee must have had a
knowledge of the conduct which the employer
expected. It is not necessary that the claimant
intended to cause harm to the employer, but he
should reasonably have been able to anticipate
the effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may
not be established unless the employer gave a
clear explanation of the expected behavior or had
a pertinent written policy, except in the case of
a flagrant violation of a universal standard of
behavior. If the employer's expectations are
unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence
of knowledge is not shown. A specific warning is
one way of showing that the employee had
knowledge of the expected conduct. After the
employee is given a warning, he should be given
an opportunity to correct objectionable conduct.
Additional violations occurring after the warning
would be necessary to establish just cause for a
discharge.
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para. Bl (1986).

7

Further, Appellant submitted no evidence as to any differences regarding the actual or potential harmful effect of marijuana
residue in the body's system stemming from passive as opposed to
direct inhalation.
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At page 9 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant "concedes that
he knew that the presence of marijuana in his system would likely
result in termination. . . . "

Appellant's concession recognizes

Respondent's establishment of a written drug testing policy in
1985, and reflects his awareness of that program prior to the
first time he tested positive for marijuana.8

The depth of his

awareness was reinforced by his conduct after the second test.

At

the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, Respondent's
Employee Relations Area Representative testified that after the
second test had been performed, but before the results were made
available, Appellant telephoned to express his concerns over a
second positive test and an "explanation" as to why he might test
positive.

Appellant stated his roommates smoked marijuana and he

was afraid of passive inhalation. (Administrative Law Judge
hearing February 11, 1988, Record at p. 16.)
The admissions of Appellant and the other evidence before
the Board established that Respondent had a written drug testing
policy, that Appellant knew testing positive for marijuana could
result in termination, and that, in addition, Appellant believed
passive inhalation could cause a positive test result possibly

8

Appellant certified under penalty of law on the ClaimHnr
Statement of Reason for Discharge (Record at p. 2) that he was
aware of the drug and alcohol testing policy, that he received a
written warning on October 7, 1987, for a previous violation of
the policy, and that he was informed that a second violation would
result in his discharge.
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resulting in termination.

Based on these facts, this Court must

find that the Board's decision with regard to the Appellant's
"knowledge"' is supported by the record.
B.

THE BOARD'S DECISION IN THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS.
Appellant claims that the Board's decision in this case

is inconsistent with this Court's decision in Champ1 in Petroleum,
supra.

The Champ1in Petroleum decision is readily distinguishable

from this case.

There, the claimant was discharged after the

employer received a medical discharge report indicating that the
claimant's mental illness and breakdown might have been
exacerbated from the claimant's intermittent use of and withdrawal
from marijuana.

The employer did not have a policy against drug

use by employees, and the employer performed no drug testing prior
to terminating the claimant.

Ld. at 332.

Further, the claimant

there was terminated because he was unable to return to work
without limitation, not because of any mental problems or
drug-related conduct.

Id., at 331.

Based on those facts, the

Administrative Law Judge, whose findings and conclusions were
adopted in full by the Board, concluded that neither the control
nor the culpability factors supported a finding of just cause.
appeal, this Court affirmed the administrative decision,
concluding that it was "well within the bounds of reason and
rationality for the Board to conclude: "(1) that [claimant's]
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On

mental illness was not sufficiently within his control; and (2)
that any exacerbation of his mental problems from his use of
marijuana did not rise to the level of fault essential to
establish just cause and deny him his unemployment benefits."
at 332-33.

Id.

Champlin Petroleum does not stand for the proposition,

as asserted by Appellant, that in order to justify the denial of
unemployment benefits, the conduct must have been committed on the
job or must have impacted job performance.9
Not only is the decision in Champlin Petroleum
distinguishable from the case at hand, but the issues here are
almost identical to those in Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. v.
Board of Review, 684 P.2d 647 (Utah 1984).

In Western Dairymen

the operator of a cheese factory appealed an order of the Board
granting unemployment benefits to employees who refused to comply
with the operator's grooming policy prohibiting employees from
wearing beards or mustaches.

Although the Board in that case did

not determine whether the grooming policy had a valid business
purpose, the Court found that the policy was intended to improve
sanitary conditions, and that it was not an extreme or

^Requiring an employer to show "actual" impact on job
performance would be contrary to the clear language of the Utah
Employment Security Act, U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(l) (wh ch only
requires conduct "adverse to the employer's interest") and the
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) 1f Bl (1986) (which
provides that the discharge must be necessary to avoid actual or
potential harm).
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unreasonable measure.

In reversing the decision of the Board, the

Utah Supreme Court held that employers have the right to formulate
rules furthering the employer's legitimate business interests.
The most important factor in determining the reasonableness of a
business purpose focuses on whether it advances the employer's
interest as opposed to being a condition of employment unrelated
to actual job needs or performance.

1^3. at 649.

Application of

that factor set forth by the Supreme Court in Western Dairymen to
the facts of this case compels a finding that the Respondent's
drug testing policy furthers legitimate business interests.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that the actionable
misconduct is not necessarily limited to conduct occurring during
the hours of employment and on the employer's premises.
Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 6 63 P.2d
440, 443 (Utah 1983).

In Clearfield City, the Court reversed the

decision of the Board and held that a police officer, fired for
engaging in off-duty sodomy, was not entitled to receive
unemployment benefits.

Off-duty conduct continues to be a

relevant consideration in determining whether employee misconduct
affects legitimate business interests of the employer.
In summary, as discussed above, sustaining the Board's
decision in this case will be consistent with precedents of the
Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals.
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C.

TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO RECOVER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AFTER
TESTING POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS
WOULD FRUSTRATE LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The Utah Employment Security Act was enacted to protect

the public from the economic insecurity created by unemployment
resulting from conduct over which the employee has no control.

It

was not enacted to allow employees to receive benefits for engaging
in conduct that is adverse to the interests of the employer,
co-employees, or the general public.

Appellant should not be

permitted to benefit from conduct that is against Respondent's and
the general public's interests by receiving unemployment
benefits.1°
The State Legislature enacted the Drug and Alcohol
Testing Act not only to provide guidelines for employers who
implement testing for drugs and alcohol, but to also protect them
from any direct actions by employees resulting from drug and
alcohol testing provided that the employer's program complies with
the Act.

U.C.A. § 34-38-1 et seg.

To allow a discharged employee

to recover unemployment benefits after being terminated for

1

°Not only will granting unemployment benefits to persons
discharged as a result of testing positive for drugs impede
employers and society from correcting drug-related workplace
problems, it would distort the entire thrust of the State's
Employment Security Act. For example, it may encourage some
employees to use their consumption of alcohol and drugs to
manipulate the system so as to allow them to be "fired" from their
employment and to then receive unemployment benefits while they
pursue other activities. This Court should not sanction such
conduct and should not reward those who test positive for drugs.
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testing positive for drugs would allow the employee to do
indirectly what he or she cannot do directly, i.e., recover money
after being discharged for testing positive for drugs.

Such a

result would frustrate the legislative intent of the Utah Drug and
Alcohol Testing Act, and would disregard public policy concerns
that led to the creation and implementation of drug testing
policies and legislation.

In effect, the employee would receive

unemployment compensation for criminal acts.
D.

APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RAISE NEW ISSUES ON
APPEAL.
Appellant and the ACLU have raised two constitutional

issues that were not raised below: equal protection and substantive
due process.

Utah courts have consistently and strongly opposed

the raising of issues for the first time on appeal.

See, e.g.,

Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986); Trimble Real Estate
v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App. 1988).
The general rule followed by Utah courts is well recognized by
courts of other jurisdictions, and is based on the ground that
courts of appeal do not have the power to review decisions of lower
courts for errors that were not raised below.
Appeal and Error, § 545.

5 Am. Jur. 2d,

This general rule applies equally when

constitutional issues are first raised on appeal, except where a
person's liberty may be at stake.

See, e.g., Pratt v. City Council

of the City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 1981).
Although Utah courts have not addressed the applicability of this
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rule in reviewing an administrative agency's decision, courts of
other states have applied this rule.

See, e . g M

Lewis v. Anaconda

Company, 543 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Mt. 1975) (claimant could not raise
constitutional issue of due process for the first time on appeal,
and court did not therefore consider it.); Smith v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board, 396 A.2d 905, 906 n.l (Pa. 1979).

Based

on the general rule, Respondent submits that the Appellant and the
ACLU may not raise new issues concerning equal protection and
substantive due process.
E.

THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE CAN BE RESOLVED WITHOUT ADDRESSING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS FIRST RAISED BY APPELLANT AND
THE ACLU ON APPEAL.
"It is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid

addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so."
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985).

State

If this Court can

decide the issues without addressing the constitutional claims
raised for the first time on appeal by Appellant and the ACLU, the
Court should do so.

See, e.g., Goodsel v. Department of Business

Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974); Clinton City v.
Patterson, 433 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah 1967).

This case involves only the

issue of whether the Appellant was discharged for just cause as
that term is defined by U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(1).

Resolution of this

issue does not require any constitutional analysis.

Accordingly,

even if this Court were to conclude that the constitutional issues
can be raised for the first time on appeal, this Court should
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avoid addressing them because the resolution of the constitutional
claims is unnecessary to decide the issue of whether Appellant was
justly discharged. ll
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Board of Review decision denying unemployment
benefits to Appellant after he was discharged for testing positive

1

*Even if this Court decides that the constitutional issues
can be raised for the first time on appeal, it is clear that the
ACLU's and the Appellant's arguments in this regard are without
merit. First, the ACLU erroneously claims that if this Court
upholds the denial of unemployment benefits based on positive drug
tests, such a determination would be unconstitutional because
there was no showing that Appellant's job performance was
impaired. That contention incorrectly analyzes the language of
the statute, implementing rules and prior cases. As set forth in
detail above, the sole issue in this case is whether the claimant
was discharged for "just cause" as defined by the Utah Employment
Security Act; U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(l) and Unemployment Insurance
Rule 35-4-5(b)(1), 1[ Bl (1986), and resolution of this issue
requires no constitutional analysis. Second, the Appellant
incorrectly asserts that the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act is
unconstitutional because it creates different classes of employers
and employees. The Act allows, but does not require, private
employers to implement drug and alcohol testing procedures
pursuant to certain guidelines. It does not prevent public
employers from implementing drug and alcohol testing policies. As
a result, even if such a constitutional argument were relevant to
the questions in this case, the Act does not create different
classes of employers and employees. See, Mountain Fuel Supply
Company v. Salt Lake City Corporation", 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988).

-22-

for marijuana on two separate occasions is supported by
substantial evidence, and should be affirmed by this Court
Dated this

Zi

sf

day of April, 1989.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
/

/

Janet Hugie Smitiy
Larry G. Moore
Paul D. Newman
Attorneys for Respondent
Morton Thiokol, Inc.
9089n
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ADDENDUM 1

Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act,
U.C.A. § 34-38-1, et seq.

CHAPTER 38
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING
Section
34-38-1.
34-38-2.
34-38-3.
34-38-4.
34-38-5.
34-38-6.
34-38-7.

34-38-8.
34-38-9.

Section
Legislative findings — Purpose
and intent of chapter.
Definitions.
Testing for drugs or alcohol.
Samples — Identification and collection.
Time of testing — Cost of testing
and transportation.
Requirements for collection and
testing.
Employer's written testing policy
— Purposes and requirements
for collection and testing —
Employer's use of test results.
Employer's disciplinary or rehabilitative actions.
No cause of action arises for failure to test or detect substance

34-38-10.

34-38-11.
34-38-12.
34-38-13.
34-38-14.
34-38-15.

34-38-1. Legislative findings
chapter.

or problem, or for termination
of testing program.
No cause of action arises against
employer unless false test result — Presumption and limitation of damages in claim
against employer.
Bases for cause of action for defamation, libel, slander, or damage to reputation.
No cause of action arises based on
failure of employer to establish
testing program.
Confidentiality of information.
Employee not "handicapped."
No physician-patient relationship
created.

Purpose and intent of

The Legislature finds that a healthy and productive work force, safe working conditions free from the effects of drugs and alcohol, and maintenance of
the quality of products produced and services rendered in this state, are important to employers, employees, and the general public. The Legislature
further finds that the abuse of drugs and alcohol creates a variety of workplace problems, including increased injuries on the job, increased absenteeism, increased financial burden on health and benefit programs, increased
workplace theft, decreased employee morale, decreased productivity, and a
decline in the quality of products and services.
Therefore, in balancing the interests of employers, employees, and the welfare of the general public, the Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing
for drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance with this chapter, is in
the best interest of all parties.
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The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any employee from seeking
damages or job reinstatement, if action was taken by his employer based on a
false drug or alcohol test result.
History. C. 1953, 34-38-1, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 1.

34-38-2. Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Alcohol" means ethyl alcohol or ethanol.
(2) "Drugs" means any substance recognized as a drug in the United
States Pharmacopeia, the National Formulary, the Homeopathic
Pharmacopeia, or other drug compendia, or supplement to any of those
compendia.
(3) "Employer" means any person, firm, or corporation, including any
public utility or transit district, which has one or more workers or operators employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.
"Employer" does not include the federal or state government, or other
local political subdivisions.
(4) "Employee" means any person in the service of an employer, as
defined by Subsection (3), for compensation.
(5) "Prospective employee" means any person who has made application to an employer, whether written or oral, to become his employee.
(6) "Sample" means urine, blood, breath, saliva, or hair.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-2, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 2.

34-38-3. Testing for drugs or alcohol.
It is not unlawful for an employer to test employees or prospective employees for the presence of drugs or alcohol, in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter, as a condition of hiring or continued employment. However,
employers and management in general must submit to the testing themselves
on a periodic basis.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-3, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 3.

34-38-4. Samples — Identification and collection.
In order to test reliably for the presence of drugs or alcohol, an employer
may require samples from his employees and prospective employees, and may
require presentation of reliable identification to the person collecting the samples. Collection of the sample shall be in conformance with the requirements
of Section 34-38-6. The employer may designate the type of sample to be used
for testing.
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34-38-6

History: C. 1953, 34-38-4, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 4.

34-38-5. Time of testing — Cost of testing and transportation.
(1) Any drug or alcohol testing by an employer shall occur during or immediately after the regular work period of current employees and shall be
deemed work time for purposes of compensation and benefits for current employees.
(2) An employer shall pay all costs of testing for drugs or alcohol required
by the employer, including the cost of transportation if the testing of a current
employee is conducted at a place other than the workplace.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 5.

34-38-6. Requirements for collection and testing.
All sample collection and testing for drugs and alcohol under this chapter
shall be performed in accordance with the following conditions:
(1) The collection of samples shall be performed under reasonable and
sanitary conditions;
(2) Samples shall be collected and tested with due regard to the privacy
of the individual being tested, and in a manner reasonably calculated to
prevent substitutions or interference with the collection or testing of reliable samples;
(3) Sample collection shall be documented, and the documentation procedures shall include:
(a) labeling of samples so as reasonably to preclude the probability
of erroneous identification of test results; and
(b) an opportunity for the employee or prospective employee to
provide notification of any information which he considers relevant
to the test, including identification of currently or recently used prescription or nonprescription drugs, or other relevant medical information.
(4) Sample collection, storage, and transportation to the place of testing shall be performed so as reasonably to preclude the probability of
sample contamination or adulteration; and
(5) Sample testing shall conform to scientifically accepted analytical
methods and procedures. Testing shall include verification or confirmation of any positive test result by gas chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or other comparably reliable analytical method,
before the result of any test may be used as a basis for any action by an
employer under Section 34-38-8.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, S 6.
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34-38-7. Employer's written testing policy — Purposes and
requirements for collection and testing — Employer's use of test results.
(1) Testing or retesting for the presence of drugs or alcohol by an employer
shall be carried out within the terms of a written policy which has been
distributed to employees and is available for review by prospective employees.
(2) Within the terms of his written policy, an employer may require the
collection and testing of samples for the following purposes:
(a) investigation of possible individual employee impairment;
(b) investigation of accidents in the workplace or incidents of workplace theft;
(c) maintenance of safety for employees or the general public; or
(d) maintenance of productivity, quality of products or services, or security of property or information.
(3) The collection and testing of samples shall be conducted in accordance
with Sections 34-38-4,34-38-5, and 34-38-6, and need not be limited to circumstances where there are indications of individual, job-related impairment of
an employee or prospective employee.
(4) The employer's use and disposition of all drug or alcohol test results are
subject to the limitations of Sections 34-38-8 and 34-38-13.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-7, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, * 7.

34-38-8. Employer's disciplinary or rehabilitative actions.
Upon receipt of a verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test result
which indicates a violation of the employer's written policy, or upon the refusal of an employee or prospective employee to provide a sample, an employer
may use that test result or refusal as the basis for disciplinary or rehabilitative actions, which may include the following:
(1) a requirement that the employee enroll in an employer-approved
rehabilitation, treatment, or counseling program, which may include additional drug or alcohol testing, as a condition of continued employment;
(2) suspension of the employee with or without pay for a period of time;
(3) termination of employment;
(4) refusal to hire a prospective employee; or
(5) other disciplinary measures in conformance with the employer's
usual procedures, including any collective bargaining agreement.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-8, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 8.

Cross-References. — State alcoholism and
drug rehabilitative services, § 63-43-3.

34-38-9. No cause of action arises for failure to test or detect substance or problem, or for termination of
testing program.
No cause of action arises in favor of any person against an employer who
has established a policy and initiated a testing program in accordance with
this chapter, for any of the following:
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34-38-11

(1) failure to test for drugs or alcohol, or failure to test for a specific
drug or other substance;
(2) failure to test for, or if tested for, failure to detect, any specific drug
or other substance, disease, infectious agent, virus, or other physical abnormality, problem, or defect of any kind; or
(3) termination or suspension of any drug or alcohol testing program or
policy.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-9, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 9.

34-38-10. No cause of action arises against employer unless false test result — Presumption and limitation of damages in claim against employer.
(1) No cause of action arises in favor of any person against an employer who
has established a program of drug or alcohol testing in accordance with this
chapter, and who has taken any action under Section 34-38-8, unless the
employer's action was based on a false test result.
(2) In any claim, including a claim under Section 34-38-11, where it is
alleged that an employer's action was based on a false test result:
(a) there is a rebuttable presumption that the test result was valid if
the employer complied with the provisions of Section 34-38-6; and
(b) the employer is not liable for monetary damages if his reliance on a
false test result was reasonable and in good faith.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-10, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 10.

34-38-11. Bases for cause of action for defamation, libel,
slander, or damage to reputation.
No cause of action for defamation of character, libel, slander, or damage to
reputation arises in favor of any person against an employer who has established a program of drug or alcohol testing in accordance with this chapter,
unless:
(1) the results of that test were disclosed to any person other than the
employer, an authorized employee or agent of the employer, the tested
employee, or the tested prospective employee;
(2) the information disclosed was based on a false test result;
(3) the false test result was disclosed with malice; and
(4) all elements of an action for defamation of character, libel, slander,
or damage to reputation as established by statute or common law, are
satisfied.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-12, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 12.
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34-38-12. No cause of action arises based on failure of employer to establish testing program.
No cause of action arises in favor of any person based upon the failure of an
employer to establish a program or policy of drug or alcohol testing.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-12, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 12.

34-38-13. Confidentiality of information.
(1) All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or test
results received by the employer through his drug or alcohol testing program
are confidential communications and may not be used or received in evidence,
obtained in discovery, or disclosed in any public or private proceeding, except
in a proceeding related to an action taken by an employer under Section
34-38-8 or an action under Section 34-38-11.
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) shall be the property of the
employer.
(3) An employer is entitled to use a drug or alcohol test result as a basis for
action under Section 34-38-8.
(4) An employer may not be examined as a witness with regard to the
information described in Subsection (1), except in a proceeding related to an
action taken by the employer under Section 34-38-8 or an action under Section
34-38-11.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-13, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 13.

34-38-14. Employee not "handicapped."
An employee or prospective employee whose drug or alcohol test results are
verified or confirmed as positive in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter shall not, by virtue of those results alone, be defined as a person with
a "handicap" for purposes of Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-14, enacted by 1.
1987, ch. 234, § 14.

34-38-15. No physician-patient relationship created.
A physician-patient relationship is not created between an employee or
prospective employee, and the employer or any person performing the test,
solely by the establishment of a drug or alcohol testing program in the workplace.
History: C. 1953, 34-38-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 234, § 15.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch.
244, § 16 provided that if any provision of that

chapter or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter is given effect without the invalid provision or application.
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ADDENDUM 2

Department of Defense Interim Rule,
53 Fed. Reg. 37,763

12-27-88

(DLR)

TEXT

(No* 248)

E-l

INTERIM DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING
DftUG FREE WORKPLACE PROGRAMS FOR CONTRACTORS
'•Employee in a sensitive position." as used
in this dause, means en employee who hae
been granted access to obtained information;
or employeos in other positions that the
contractor determines involve notional
2. A new Subpart 223,75, consisting of
security, health or safety, or function* othor
sections 2237500 through 23.?504, i«
then theforegoingrequiring a high degree of
added to read as follows;
trust end confidence.
Subpart 223.75—Drug-free Work Pgrc©
(b) The Contractor agrees to institute and
maintain a prosrramforachieving the
Sue,
ebJseuVe or a drag-free work force, While
2237500 Scope at subpart.
this clause defines criteria for such a
S2SJS01 Policy.
prOfr&nli Contractors are encouraged to
223.7502 Definitions,
implement alternative ipproacheS
223.7503 General
comparable to the criteria in paragraph (c)
229.7504 Contract ele\taa,
below that are designed to achieve the
Objectives of this eCuse.
Subpart 223.75—Drug-Free Wortc
(c) Contractor programs shah* Include the
Force
following, or appropriate alternative*
(1) Employee assistance programs
223.7500 Scope of subpart
emphasising Ugh level direction, education,
This subpart proscribed policies and
counseling, rehabilitation, and coordination
procedures concerning drug abuse *a it
with available community resources;
223,7504 Contract dause.
impacts on the performance of defame
(Z} Supervisory training, to csefat in
contracts. Department a may establish
The contracting officer shall Insert the identifying and addressing Illegal drug UBe by
eparial procedures as they determine
clause at 252.223-7500 in all soliriutiona Contractor employees;
(3) Provision For seir-rcfenats as wutl QD
necessary to satisfy their mission
and contracts that meet the following
supervisory
referral*to treatment with
requirements,
criteria;
maximum respect for individual
(a) All contracts involving access to
confidentiality consistent with safety and
23.7501 Policy,
classified information;
security issues;
It is the policy of the Department of
(4) Provision for identifying illegal drug
(b) Any other contract when the
Defense that defense contractors shall
users, including testing on a controlled and
contracting officer determines that
maintain a program for achieving a
carefully monitored basis. Employee drug
inclusion of the clause Is necesiary for
drug-free work force.
testing progreme ahell be established taking
reasons of national security or for the
account of the following
223.7502 Definition!*
purpose of protecting the health or
(i) The Contractor shall establish e program
"Illegal drugs/* as used in this
that provides for testing for the use of Utcgal
§afoty of those using or affected b.v the
drugi by employees In eoniitive positions.
subpart,means oo$trolle$ substances
product of or the performance of the
The extent of and criteria for such testing
included in Schedule 1 and Git as defined contract (except for commercial or
shall be determined by the Contractor baaed
by section 802(6) of Title 21 of the
commercial-type products (ace FAR
on considerations that include the nature of
United States Code, the possession of
11.001)),
the work bains performed under the contract,
which is unlawful under Chapter IS of
(c) This clause does not apply, to a
the employee's duties, the efficient use of
that Title. The term "illegal druca" does
contract or to that part of a contract,
Contractor resources, and therisksto public
not mean the use of a controlled
health, safety, national security that could
that ia to be performed outside of the
substance pursuant to a valid
roiult from the failure of an employee
United States, its territories, and
prescription or other uses authorized by
adequately to discharge his or her position
possessions, except as otherwise
law.
(iti Ip addition, the Contractor mey
determined by the contacting office*
estaoUffh a programforemployee drug
"Employee in a sensitive position," ea
testing—
used In thiu subpart, mesne an employee
(A) When there ia a reasonable suspicion
PART
252—SOUCITATIOM
who baa been granted access to
that an employee uses illegal drugs; or
PROVISIONS
AND
CONTRACT
classified information; or employees in
(B) When a employes has been invoked in
CLAUSES,
other positions that the contractor
•njiB (dent orunsafe practice;
determines involve National Security,
9. Section 252.229-7500 is added to
(C) As part bTor as eTollcw-up to
counseling or rehabilitationforibegal drug
health or safety, or functions other than read as follows;
use;
the foregoing requiring e high'degree of
232£2S~r50Q Drug-froa work force.
(D) As part of a voluntary employee drug
trust and confidence.
testing program,
As proscribed in 223.7504, insert the
(lit) The Contractor mey eetabldh «
223.7503 General.
following dause:
program to test applicants for employment for
Drug-fte* Work Force {Sep 3952)
(a) The use of illegal drugs, on or off
illegal drug use.
(a) Definitions. "Illegal drugs** as used in
duty, is inconsistent with law-abiding
(fv) For the purpose of administering this
this clause, means controlled substances
douse, testingforUlegol druas may be limited
behavior expected of all citizen*.
Included in Schedule I and S, «• defined by
to those substances for which testing is
Employees who use illegal drugs, on or
off duty, tend to be less productive, less section $02(6) of Tide 21 of the United States prescribed by section M of Subpart B of the
Code, the possession of which is unlawful
''Mandatory Guidelines for Federal
reliable, end prone to greater
under Chapter 19 Of that Tills. The term
Workplace Drug Teeting Programs,'* (S3 PR
absenteeism resulting in the potential
"illegal drugs* does not moan the use of a
11980 (April tl, 19881), issued by the
for Increased cost, delay, and risk to the controlled substance pursuant to a valid
Department of Health and Human Service*
government contract.
prescription or other uses authorized by lew.
(d) Contractors shall adopt appropriate
PART 223-ENVIRONMENT,
CONSERVATION AND
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

(b) The use of illegal drugs, on or oS
•duty, by employees can impair the
ability of those employees to perform
tasks that are critical to proper contract
performance and can also result in the
potential for accident's on duty end for
failures that can pose a serious throat to
national security, health, and safety.
(o) The use of illegal drugs, on or off
duty, by employees in certain positions
can result In less than the complete
reliability, stability, and good judgment
that are consistent with access to
sensitive information. Use of Illegal
drugs also creates the possibility of
coercion, influence, and irresponsible
action underpressure that mey pose a
serious risk to national security, and
health and aafety,
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TEXT

(No. 248)

personnel procedure to deal With employes
who art found 10 bt usinj drug* moaally.
Contractor! shall not aUcw any employee to
remain on duty or perform Ic a leneltlva
position who is found to use MC&BI dregs
until tuch Ume • • tha oonirador. In

accordance with procedures established by

tho contractor,rfatarminesthat tha tmployoa
may perform In such a position.
(e) The provisions o! tbti c k w e pertaining
Hi drug totbg programs shall not apply to
the extent they are Inconsistent with state pr
local law, or with an existing collective

(DLR.)
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betgainint agreement; provided that with
respect to the latter, the Contractor agrees
that those isevci that are In wmfliot will be a
s\»bje©t of negotiation at the next collective
bargaining session,
(End of clause)

~ End of Text-End of Section B -
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ADDENDUM 3

Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
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listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescription;
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1) (a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marihuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
[2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place,
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent,
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Subsection
78-3a-2(3), and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of
pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
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(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person is
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect
to:
(i) marihuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marihuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marihuana, if the amount is more than one ounce but less
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or
(iii), including less than one ounce of marihuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through
(2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor;
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not
authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized
by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree
felony.
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(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist,
veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, or to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or
procure the administration of, any controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any application, report, or other document required to be kept by this chapter, or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful
under this section, Chapter 37a, Title 58, the Drug Paraphernalia Act, or
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an
activity sponsored by or through a school under Subsection (5)(a)(i);
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii); or
(iv) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, nor is the person eligible for parole until
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the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense, or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-35-20, may, if
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to lk the maximum sentence imposed by
law for the offense committed.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event
later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
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(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the
evidence the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b).
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985,
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92,
$ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; L. 1988, ch. 95, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 92 deleted "as provided in
Section 58-1-44" following "the consent" in the
first sentence in Subsection (2)(a)(v) and made
minor stylistic changes.
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 190 rewrote this section, which formerly read as it
appears in the bound volume.
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled
by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, substituted "convicted of violating" for

"who violates" throughout the section; deleted
"upon conviction" preceding "guilty" in Subsections (l)(b)(i) to UXbXiii), (2)(b)(ii), and (2)(d);
in Subsection (2)(b) inserted Subsection
(2)(b)(i); divided former Subsection (2)(b)(i) into
present Subsections (2)(b)(ii) and (2)(b)(iii) and
(2)(c) and designated former Subsection
(2)(b)(ii) as Subsection (2)(d); designated former Subsection (2)(c) as Subsection (2)(e); in
present Subsection (2)(b)(ii) inserted "if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than
100 pounds,"; in Subsection (3)(b) deleted
"upon conviction" preceding "be punished" in
the first sentence; in Subsection (4Kb) deleted
"upon conviction" preceding "is guilty"; and
made various stylistic changes throughout the
section.
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Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arranging sale.
Charging offense under Controlled Substances Act or Criminal Code.
—Jury instructions.
Distribution.
—Arranging to distribute.
—Distribution for value.
Entrapment.
Jury instruction.
Sufficiency of evidence.
—Constructive possession.
—Production of marijuana.
Cited.
Arranging sale.
This section unmistakably prohibits arranging to distribute a controlled substance. State
v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987).
Charging offense under Controlled Substances Act or Criminal Code.
—Jury instructions.
Wherever culpable conduct arises under the
Controlled Substances Act and is specifically
defined by it, it is incumbent upon trial courts
to reject instructions to the jury under more
general provisions outside the act. State v.
Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987).
Although jury was improperly instructed on
aiding and abetting rather than on Subsection
(l)(a)(iv) of this section, because defendant was
convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and not of aiding
and abetting, the aiding and abetting instruction was superfluous and not the basis of the
jury's verdict, and the instruction error was
harmless. State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
Distribution.
In determining whether there is sufficient
evidence to support a charge of distribution of
a controlled substance for value, the relevant
concern is whether the defendant performed
the actual sale, or merely acted as an agent
between the buyer and the source. The latter
action does not fall within the prohibition of
distribution of a controlled substance for value.
State v. Wright, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Ct.
App. 1987).
The evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for distribution of a controlled substance where the defendant, who was approached with a request to sell marijuana to a
police officer, agreed, quoted the selling price,
and then personally delivered the contraband

and received the money at his apartment; he
did not purport to merely find, direct, and introduce the officer to another drug dealer.
State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987).
—Arranging to distribute.
A person cannot be charged with aiding and
abetting another when he or she handles the
negotiations and price of a controlled substance, but must instead be charged with
agreeing, consenting, offering, or negotiating
to distribute a controlled substance as specifically provided in section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv).
State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987).
Any willing or intentional lending of aid in
the distribution of drugs, in whatever form the
aid takes, is proscribed by Subsection (l)(a)(iv),
and it is not necessary for the defendant to receive any value in exchange for drugs to be
convicted. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986).
—Distribution for value.
An exchange of cash for a controlled substance clearly falls within the broad definition
of "distribution for value"; whether the defendant realizes a profit or not is irrelevant. State
v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986).
Entrapment
Defendant was not entrapped for unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance
where, although the police officer visited the
defendant's office on several occasions, the
visits were with defendant's invitation or consent. State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah
1986).
The question of entrapment was properly left
to the jury, where an undercover police officer,
who had reason to believe that defendant was
involved in drug trafficking, asked defendant
to sell him cocaine on four occasions over a
forty-day period and, on the fourth contact, de-
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fendant agreed to sell him cocaine, made arrangements to pick it up, and sold him a gram.
State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986).
Evidence sufficient to show intent to distribute.
See State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah
1986).
Jury instruction.
The point of law covered under this catchline
in the bound volume was overruled in State v.
Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987).
Sufficiency of evidence.
In accord with 1986 Replacement Volume.
See State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132 (Utah
1987).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for unlawful production of a
controlled substance, where it was shown that
marijuana was being cultivated and produced
on a lot enclosed by a fence, in a greenhouse
located twenty feet to the rear of defendant's
dwelling, and only accessible through defendant's property. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219
(Utah 1988).
—Constructive possession.
Actual physical possession is not a required
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element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance. A finding of constructive
possession by the defendant will satisfy the
possession element. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d
127 (Utah 1987).
To prove that a defendant was in knowing
and intentional possession of a controlled substance, the prosecution need only establish
that the produced contraband was found in a
place or under circumstances indicating that
the accused had the ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over it. State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987).
—Production of marijuana.
In a trial for production of a controlled substance it was held that the state's evidence
supported the trial court's finding that scientific tests (together with the objective observations of professional narcotics agents) proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the substance
seized from defendant was marijuana. State v.
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Cited in State v. Neilsen, 727 P.2d 188
(Utah 1986), cert, denied, — U.S.—, 107 S. Ct.
1565, 94 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Federal criminal liability of narcotics conspirator for different substantive
crime of other conspirator, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 661.
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of marijuana had intent to distribute it, so as to violate 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 79 A.L.R. Fed. 113.
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of heroin had intent to distribute it, so as to violate
21 USCS § 841(a)(i), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 413.

Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of cocaine had intent to distribute it, so as to violate
21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 80 A.L.R. Fed. 397.
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of controlled substance other than cocaine, heroin, or
marijuana had intent to distribute it, so as to
violate 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 80 A.L.R. Fed.
507.
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